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Abstract
The two-way capital ows has been a persistent pattern existing in international
capital market, i.e. net bond asset ows from developed countries to developing
countries as a whole while net equity asset goes the other way around at the same
time. In this paper, I construct a model of two-country open economy within which
each country is subject to New-Keynesian frictions. Using new techniques of com-
puting portfolio choices in macroeconomic models, I solve for the country holdings
of equity and bond assets in such a general framework. Based on the recent work
which estimate New-Keynesian macroeconomic model of US and Chinese economy,
I introduce empirically relevant cross-country asymmetries with regard to di¤erent
economic structure, country openness, monetary policy stance and severity of fric-
tions, etc. in the model and show that the pattern of the two-way capital ows
emerges as a result of agents seeking to attain high level of risk-sharing across coun-
tries through optimal portfolio allocation.
Keywords: International portfolio choices, Two-way capital ows, Emerging
markets.
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1 Introduction
In international macroeconomics, the so-called two-way capital ows between developing
and developed countries is an interesting phenomenon, i.e. net bond asset ows towards
developing countries while net equity asset ows towards developed countries as a whole.
(See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007a, 2007b, Ju and Wei, 2010.) What is the reason
for this phenomenon? Why do equity and bond assets ow in such ways rather than
the other way around? Are there any casual links between the stage of development of
a country and their preference over di¤erent types of international assets? If there are,
what are they and how do they work? This paper seeks to answer these questions.
There has been an increasingly large literature studying net capital ows between
developing and developed worlds since 1990 when Lucas (1990) proposed the famous
question of why does capital not ow from developed countries to developing countries.
Or even though it does why is this ow not stronger than observed. Based on standard
neoclassical models, capital tends to ow to where it is able to yield a higher return.
And the most basic reason for a di¤ering return in such models is the degree of capital
scarcity. Since developing countries are usually capital scarce in comparison to developed
countries, the model predicts that net capital should ow from the latter to the former.
The puzzle might not have gained so much attention if it was just a problem of size in a
world of balanced international payments. In a world featuring global imbalances, as has
emerged since 1990, this becomes even more puzzling because net capital actually ows
the opposite way to that predicted by the neoclassical model.
Various theories have been proposed to explain this puzzling fact. Explanations include
policy misalignments (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2007, Summers, 2004, Blanchard et al., 2005,
etc.), di¤erence in productivity growth (Hunt et al., 2005, Engle and Rogers, 2006),
demographic dynamics (Henriksen, 2005, Attanasio et al., 2006), volatility of the business
cycle (Fogli and Perri, 2006) and a global savings glut (Bernanke, 2005) etc. In particular,
one strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of nancial underdevelopment of
developing countries in reconciling the facts. According to these studies, various nancial
frictions, for instance lack of enforceability of nancial contracts (Mendoza et al., 2009),
incapability in supplying a su¢ cient asset stock (Caballero et al., 2009) or/and in insuring
away idiosyncratic risk (Angeletos and Panousi, 2011) etc., can distort the decisions of
saving and investment in emerging markets, which in turn results in both a lower interest
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rate and a lower capital stock in autarky. While saving cannot be e¤ectively channelled
to investment domestically due to these nancial frictions, under nancial integration,
excess saving must nd its way to developed countries in the form of a net capital ow.
There is also an expanding literature on two-way capital ows (i.e. where bonds
and equity ows in opposite directions). Most of this literature also focuses exploring
the e¤ects of nancial distortions on the choices of di¤erent types of asset. Ju and Wei
(2010) attribute the major reason to nancial market imperfections and related institu-
tions such as property rights protection. The mechanism of nancial capital owing out
while investment arriving in the form of FDI can serve as a nice vehicle bypassing the
adverse e¤ect of an ine¢ cient nancial system within developing countries. Hagen and
Zhang (2011) model nancial development as an endowment xed in the short run. With
the comparative advantage of providing nancial service, developed countries will nd it
optimal to import nancial capital and export FDI while the developing countries follow
the opposite pattern. Wang et al. (2015) show that the common presence of underdevel-
opment factors in the credit market of developing countries can lower the rate of return
of nancial capital while raise that of xed capital at the same time. So under capital
liberalization, nancial capital ows out while the xed capital ows in.
Rather than mainly focusing on the return and mobility aspects of assets in the above
literature, another strand of literature such as Devereux and Sutherland (2010; 2011) and
Tille and Wincoop (2010) pay attention to di¤erent risk characteristics of international
assets and the role they play in determining capital ows. The asset holdings of a country
are determined because all assets have di¤erent risk characteristics and thus satisfy specic
demands of households in di¤erent countries for risk-hedging devices. This approach
allows for the analysis of many other potential factors in addition to nancial frictions
that behind net capital ows. The current paper falls in the category of this literature in
explaining two-way capital ows. However, Devereux and Sutherland (2010; 2011) focuse
on methodological usefulness while Tille and Wincoop (2010) on (both net and gross)
portfolio dynamics in a world of two symmetric countries. In terms of two-way capital
ows, asymmetries must be involved.
The analytical framework in this paper is a model of a two-country world. Two types
of assets, equity and bond, are assumed to be present. In separation, each country can
be described by a medium-scale full-edged model of the New Keynesian approach. So
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as a whole, the model of the two economies also represents an extension of the literature
such as Woodford (2003), Gali (2008), Christiano et al. (2010), etc. to the context of
international economy with endogenous portfolio choices. Specically, the environment
in each country is very close to that of Smets and Wouters (2007). For our purpose
of distinguishing developing and developed country, we assume di¤erent values of struc-
tural parameters for them. These parameters capture various aspects in which the two
economies may di¤er, including those of economic structure, policy stance, severity of
various (real and nominal) frictions and properties of economic shocks, etc.. The stud-
ies in the literature employing econometric techniques to estimate the DSGE models of
developed (for instance Smets and Wouters, 2003; 2007, etc.) and developing countries
(for instance Sun and Sen, 2012, Dai, 2012 and Miao and Peng 2012, etc.) provide us
with these parameter values of empirical relevance. Given the presence of the country
asymmetries, optimal portfolio choices are computed and then assessed from the perspec-
tive of conforming to or contradicting the pattern of two-way capital ows. Through this
process, we uncover which asymmetries matter and to what extent they matter.
To summerize our ndings, rstly, we nd that the asymmetries associated with coun-
trys industrial structure, severity of nominal rigidities, trade openness, consumption home
bias, investment adjustment frictions, monetary policy stance, market competitiveness
and pricing strategy of international trade, etc. can cause the two-way capital ows be-
tween developing and developed countries. Secondly, among these factors, those from
the real side of economy are more important than those from the nominal side. Lastly,
we simulate the model with fully asymmetric parameter values and nd that it yields a
portfolio allocation that are broadly consistent with the pattern of two-way capital ows.
Besides, if we take into account of the situation where international bonds can only be
issued by the developed country (as it is often the case in reality), this result still holds.
This work is closely related to Devereux and Sutherland (2009). The latter considers
asymmetry in asset market structure and nds that under the pattern of two-way capital
ows the economies achieve a relatively high level of international risk-sharing, which
supplies evidence in support of the emergence of the pattern. We follow a similar idea in
this paper, however, with substantial extension of the model and analysis. This, on the
other hand, explains why we need such a general framework of New Keynesian approach
(with each economy being modelled with rich features) in this paper. Non-trivial mon-
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etary policy is present so that bond assetsreturn can be dened while many frictions,
price/wage rigidities and costy investment adjustments for instance, are assumed here so
that a long list of asymmetries associated with these features can be examined in the
analysis. The work is also linked to Devereux et al. (2014) when it comes to decomposing
the hedging properties of assets into correlation and variability e¤ects which sheds light
on the machinery of each asymmetry. With the presence of the central role of di¤ering
hedging properties of di¤erent types of asset in the model, it also connects to the literature
on (symmetric) asset home bias in international macroeconomics. Coeurdacier and Rey
(2012) give a survey of the literature on this topic.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the determination, representation and interpretation of optimal country
portfolios in the general model. Section 4 simulates the model symmetrically. Section
5 simulates the model asymmetrically and assesses country asymmetriesimpact on the
pattern of two-way capital ows. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model assumes a world consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign. For the
readers convenience, a gure, Figure 1, is employed to summarize the economic structure
of the two countries. At the top of the gure is a diagram of resource ows while on
the lower half are some key points of information. The two countries are the same in
terms of economic structure, which is reected by the fact that the ows in the foreign
country are drawn to be a mirror image of those in the home country. As shown in the
diagram, each economy consists of ve sectors. From left to right, they are the sector of
households, labour union, intermediate goods sector, nal goods sector and government.
The lines linking sectors represent resource ows with the arrows showing the direction
of ow. In each economy, households consume nal goods from both home and foreign
countries. They supply, domestically, their labour to labour unions for wages and capital
to intermediate goods rms for capital rental. The labour unions distribute the labour
supplies. And the intermediate goods rms combine the labour and capital collected to
produce intermediate goods whose usefulness is only to be sold to the nal goods sector.
The rms in the nal goods sector produce the nal goods which are then ready for use
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Figure 1: The structure of the model
for consumption and investment.
Following the literature, the intermediate and nal goods rms are further divided
into two parallel sectors of traded and non-traded goods production in both countries.
In the diagram, this is reected by the fact that the traded goods sectors are circled
in a shadowed area. The traded and non-traded goods sectors are di¤erent such that
the nal goods produced by non-traded sectors can only be sold to domestic households
while the nal goods produced by the traded sector can be sold to both domestic and
foreign households. There is one public sector, government, in the economy. They tax
and consume on the one hand and implement scal and monetary policies according to
rules on the other hand.
On the lower half of the gure, the rst row lists the frictions embedded in the private
sector and the policy rules adopted by the governments while the second row lists the
shocks that are present. Being put forward without explanation, they are gathered here
to give a better general description of the whole model and will be explained in more
detail below. In what follows, the complete behaviours of each sector will be specied.
However, because the two economies have the same structure, we will focus on the case
of the home country. As a convention, when it is necessary to mention foreign country
variables, an asterisk is used.
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2.1 Households
Assume a continuum of household z 2 (0 1). The representative household z is an in-
tertemporal optimizer whose objective is to maximize the following utility function:
Et
1X
i=0
i
(
C1 Xt+i (z)
1     t+i
Lt+i

)
(2.1)
The function is an expected summation of an innite series of single period utility. The
latter equals the utility from consumption of a composite good C,
C1 Xt+i(z)
1  , less the disu-
tility from hours worked, t+i
Lt+i

. ,  and  are respectively the discount factor, the
risk aversion parameter (or inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and
the elasticity of labour supply.  represents a weight between consumption and working
hours. It is assumed to be a labour supply shock following the process bt = bt 1 + "xt
where a hat over a variable indicates a log-deviation from the steady state. Here if "xt is
realized to be positive, there is negative shock to the labour supply.
The household z faces two restrictions when maximizing the above utility function.
First, there is an (external) habit formation process
CXt+i (z) = Ct+i (z)  hCt+i 1 (2.2)
where h is the degree of habit persistence.
Second, the household should meet the intertemporal budget constraint as follows:
Ft = 
4
i=1ritit 1 +
wt
Pt
Lt   Ct (z) + t + t   Tt (2.3)
where Ft is the net wealth of households at the end of time t. In the model of representative
agents, it also denotes per capita net foreign asset (NFA) of the country. We assume
that both the home and foreign countries issue equities and bonds. So there are 22 = 4
assets in total in the model. To understand the budget constraint, note that we denote
the households holding of asset i at the end of time t as it, so Ft = 4i=1it. We
further denote the gross rate of return for asset i during period t as rit, so the total return
by holding the time-(t  1) portfolio to the end of time t is given by 4i=1ritit 1 which
explains the rst term on the right hand side of Eq.(2:3). For the rest of the terms on
the right hand side, wt is the nominal wage received by households. Pt is home country
CPI, i.e. price index of composite good C. Lt is labour supply so wtPtLt is labour income.
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We assume that households own rms and the labour unions. t and t in the equation
denote the prots of rms and labour unions that are received by households. Ct (z) and
Tt are households spending on consumptions and taxation. So the budget constraint
states that the amount of net total wealth each period is given by the sum of the gross
return by holding existing portfolio and the newly earned saving.
The householdschoice variables include the levels of consumption C, labour supply
L and portfolio holdings is. The rst-order conditions associated with optimal C, L and
is are respectively:

t+i = 
iC Xt+i (2.4)
wt = tL
 1
t Pt
1

t
= tL
 1
t PtC

Xt (2.5)
C Xt = Et

C Xt+1rit+1

(2.6)
where 
t+i are multipliers for budget constraints at time t + i. Eqs.(2:4) and (2:5) are
familiar intertemporal and intratemporal optimal conditions which dene optimal C and
L. Eq.(2:6) determines the optimal portfolio choices i. To understand it, it asserts that
at the optimum, the marginal loss of utility by forgoing consumption (and investing in an
asset) today should be equal to the marginal gain of utility by reaping the asset return
tomorrow after discounting.
Once C is determined, following the literature, we assume the composite good is made
up of non-traded and traded goods by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation relation as follows:
C =


1
C
 1

N + (1  )
1
 C
 1

T
 
 1
(2.7)
where CN and CT are consumptions of non-traded and traded goods. Their weights in
the basket are respectively  and (1  ).  is the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of good.
Investment goods are assumed to be aggregated in the same way, so
I =


1
 I
 1

N + (1  )
1
 I
 1

T
 
 1
(2.8)
Given the aggregation relations of spending above, the demands for non-traded and
traded goods in the home country are given by
DN =  (C + I)

PN
P
 
(2.9)
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DT = (1  ) (C + I)

PT
P
 
(2.10)
where PT and PN denote price indices for traded and non-traded goods. Moreover, the
price index of the composite good at home P is
P =
h
P 1 N + (1  )P 1 T
i 1
1 
(2.11)
Further assume that the demand for traded goods is made up of home and foreign
traded goods (with subscript of H and F respectively) by the same technology with the
weight and elasticity of substitution being now  and :
CT =
h

1
C
 1

H + (1  )
1
 C
 1

F
i 
 1
(2.12)
IT =
h

1
 I
 1

H + (1  )
1
 I
 1

F
i 
 1
(2.13)
Combining with their foreign counterparts, it follows that the home demands of home
and foreign traded goods are respectively:
DH = DT

PD
PT
 
(2.14)
DF = (1  )DT

S

P X
PT
 
(2.15)
and the foreign demands of home and foreign traded goods are respectively:
DH = (1  )DT

S PX
P T
 
(2.16)
DF = D

T

P D
P T
 
(2.17)
where PD and PX are prices of home traded goods for home and foreign buyers. P D and
P X are prices of foreign traded goods for foreign and home buyers. Note that in Eqs.(2:15)
and (2:16), prices of exports P X and PX are converted to local terms if they are not set
through local currency pricing (LCP ) but rather the producer currency pricing (PCP ).
The nominal exchange rate S, dened as the price of foreign currency in terms of home
currency, is thus involved in the above equations. Note we use a switch parameter of
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di¤erent pricing strategies  here. It takes the value of 1 in the PCP case or 0 in the
LCP case.
The price index of the home traded goods is thus
PT =
h
P 1 D + (1  )
 
S

P X
1 i 11 
(2.18)
The price index of the foreign traded goods P T has a similar expression.
2.2 Labour unions
The representative labour union z buys labour from households and sells it to intermediate
goods producers. Their problem is to maximize the following prot function
Et
1X
i=0

t+it+i (2.19)
with subject to

t+i = 
iC Xt+i (2.20)
Lt (z) = Lt

wt (z)
Wt
 
(2.21)
t = Lt (z)
wt (z)
Pt
  Lt (z) wt
Pt
(2.22)
We assume that they use the same discount factor as the one used by households, which
leads to Eq.(2:20). w (z) and W denote respectively the optimal (nominal) wage which is
set by z and the aggregate wage index of labour sold to intermediate goods sector. With
a constant elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of labour supply , the labour
amount sold by the labour union is given by Lt (z) by Eq.(2:21). Using wt to represent
the nominal wage paid by the labour union to households, we obtain the labour unions
period prot function, i.e. Eq.(2:22).
This denes the problem of how wt (z) is chosen optimally. Moreover, we assume that
the process of wage setting su¤ers from a rigidity friction. Wages adjust infrequently
through a Calvo-type contract. Each time only a fraction of all wages (1  &) can be reset
and the rest of wages & are indexed to past ination automatically with an indexation
degree of $.
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To solve the labour unions problem, note that the related Lagrangian equation is:
Et
1X
i=0

t+i&
i
8><>: Lt+i
h
wt(z)
Wt+i

Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i1 
Wt+i
Pt+i
 Lt+i
h
wt(z)
Wt+i

Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i 
wt+i
Pt+i
9>=>; (2.23)
By the associated rst-order condition, the optimal wage rate set at time t can be
obtained as:
wt (z) =

   1
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i&
iLt+i
W t+i
Pt+i
h
Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i 
wt+i
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i&
iLt+i
W t+i
Pt+i
h
Wt+i 1
Wt 1
$i1  (2.24)
from which it is clear that the optimal wage is a mark-up over a weighted average of
future marginal cost of labour wt+i. The weight is a¤ected by the degree of wage rigidity
& and other variables. The stronger the degree of wage rigidity, i.e. a high &, the less
is the importance of the current marginal cost comparing to the future marginal cost.
The mark-up factor 
 1 is a function of the elasticity of labour substitution . The lower
is the substitution rate , the lower is the market competitiveness and the higher is the
mark-up. We introduce a mark-up shock V = 
 1 here and we assume that it follows the
process V^t = V V^t 1 + "V . When there is a positive realization of "V , there is a negative
shock to market power in labour market.
Given the optimal wage Xwt  wt (z), by aggregation, the aggregate wage index Wt is
given by:
Wt =
(
&

Wt 1

Wt 1
Wt 2
$1 
+ (1  &)X1 wt
) 1
1 
(2.25)
2.3 Intermediate goods rms
As mentioned before, there are two parallel intermediate goods sectors within each coun-
try. In either sector, the rms only supply intermediate goods to nal goods rms of the
same sector. Except for this di¤erence, the structure of the two intermediate goods sectors
is the same. So in this subsection, unless it is necessary, we only discuss the behaviour of
the traded sector. The related equations for non-traded sector are similar.
The intermediate rms buy labour and capital and combine them to produce the
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intermediate goods. For a representative rm z, its problem is to maximize its prot:
Et
1X
i=0

t+iMt+i (2.26)
with subject to
Mt+i =
qt
Pt
Yt   Wt
Pt
Lt   It  
 
 
"tIt   I
2
2I
(2.27)
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt (2.28)
Yt = AtK
1 a
t 1 L
a
t (2.29)
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form, Eq.(2:29). The
share of labour L and capital K in the output are respectively a and 1  a. The factors
of technology or e¢ ciency enter the function through variable A. Following the literature
(for instance Corsetti et al., 2008 and Devereux et al. 2014), the exogenous state vector
of technology A^ 
h
A^T A^N
i
are assumed to evolve according to
A^Tt = TT1A^Tt 1 + TT2A^Tt 1 + TN1A^Nt 1 + TN2A^

Nt 1 + "T (2.30)
A^Nt = NT1A^Tt 1 + NT2A^Tt 1 + NN1A^Nt 1 + NN2A^

Nt 1 + "N (2.31)
where ["T "N ] are disturbances to technology.
Eq.(2:28) is the standard capital accumulation equation. Capital at the end of time
t, Kt+1, equals the sum of the investment this period, It, and the depreciation-adjusted
capital stock, (1  )Kt. The capital depreciation rate is .
Eq.(2:27) gives the prot function for the intermediate goods rm. q is the price of
intermediate goods. The rst term of the equation represents the income by selling the
goods. The second and third terms on the right hand side of the equation represent
the cost of the labour and capital inputs respectively. We assume a cost of investment
adjustment, i.e.
 ("tIt I)2
2I
. The cost function is set to be a quadratic form mainly out of
tractability. Moreover, it also implies that both accumulation and decumulation of capital
will incur adjustment cost and the cost is marginally increasing. The parameter  is used
to govern the degree of the friction. We assume there is a shock variable "t that a¤ects
investment-adjustment cost which follows the process of "^t = ""^t 1 + "".
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The choice variables for intermediate goods rm are labour demand L, investment I
and capital stock K. The associated rst-order conditions are:
MPLt =
Wt
qt
(2.32)
	t =
"
1 +
 
 
"tIt   I

I
"t
#
(2.33)

t	t = Et
t+1

qt+1
Pt+1
MPKt+1 + (1  ) 	t+1

= Et
t+1RKt+1 (2.34)
The optimal L is determined by Eq.(2:32). The condition states that at the optimum the
marginal product of labour should be equal to the real wage, which should be familiar.
Eq.(2:33) is a type of Tobins Q equation where the price of the investment goods is set
to be the same as the price of the nal goods which is normalized to 1. The 	 on the left
hand side of the equation is the multiplier associated with the constraint of Eq.(2:28). It
also stands for the marginal product of investment. In equilibrium, it should be equal
to the marginal cost of investment on the right hand side. This equation ties down the
optimal investment It. Eq.(2:34) determines the optimal capital stock Kt. It balances
the intertemporal use of capital. Existing capital can either be used today or be invested
as capital tomorrow. At optimum, there should be no di¤erence between the marginal
benets of the two di¤erent uses.
2.4 Final goods rms
The nal goods sector is also divided into traded and non-traded sectors. As before, in
this subsection, we only consider the traded sector. The equations for the non-traded
sector are similar. In addition, because the rms in the traded sector have to set the price
for exports, this again involves di¤erent pricing strategies, i.e. whether PCP or LCP is
adopted. In what follows, as before, this is represented by the cases of  = 1 for PCP
and  = 0 for LCP .
The structure of the problem of the nal goods sector is similar to that of the labour
unions. The rms buy intermediate goods from the intermediate goods sector, transform
them into nal goods and sell the goods to domestic and foreign buyers. The goods have
some degree of heterogeneity so rms have power to set prices. However, the prices cannot
change every period. The change is subject to a Calvo-type price rigidity.
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A representative rm z chooses pDt (z) and pXt (z) to maximize the prot function:
Et
1X
i=0

t+iFt+i (2.35)
subject to
Ft = y1t (z)
pDt (z)
PDt
PDt
Pt
+ y2t (z)
pXt (z)
PXt
S1 t PXt
Pt
  y1t (z) qTt
Pt
  y2t (z) qTt
Pt
(2.36)
y1t (z) = Dt

pDt (z)
PDt
 '
(2.37)
y2t (z) = D

t

pXt (z)
PXt
 '
(2.38)
pDt (z) and pXt (z) are the prices of home traded goods for home and foreign buyers
respectively. With the assumptions of a constant elasticity of substitution ', the demand
for zs goods from home and foreign countries y1t (z) and y2t (z) are given by Eqs.(2:37)
and (2:38). So the rst two terms on the right hand side of Eq.(2:36) are the related
income by selling nal goods while the last two terms are the costs of buying intermediate
goods. By taking the di¤erence of the two, Eq.(2:36) gives the prot of rm z at period
t.
We assume that the degree of price rigidity and price indexation are given by  and
! respectively, the related Lagrangian equation of the nal goods rms problem can be
set up following the same logic as in Eq.(2:23). The associated rst-order conditions lead
to the optimal pDt (z)
pDt (z) =
'
1  '
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i
i Dt+i
Pt+i
P'Dt+i
h
PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i '
qTt+i
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i
i Dt+i
Pt+i
P'Dt+i
h
PDt+i 1
PDt 1
!i1 ' (2.39)
and the optimal pXt (z)
pXt (z) =
'
1  '
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i
i D

t+i
Pt+i
P'Xt+i
h
PXt+i 1
PXt 1
!i '
qTt+i
S1 t+i
Et
P1
i=0 
t+i
i D

t+i
Pt+i
P'Xt+i
h
PXt+i 1
PXt 1
!i1 ' (2.40)
As before, the optimal prices under the nominal rigidity are markups over weighted av-
erage of the current and future marginal costs qTt+i and
qTt+i
St+i
. The weight over time is
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a¤ected by how serious is the price rigidity, i.e. . And the markup is mainly controlled
by the degree of the market competitiveness i.e. '. As in the case of the labour union,
we assume V = '
1 ' is a price markup shock and assume that it follows the process of
V^t = V V^t 1 + "V .
2.5 Government
The government implements both scal and monetary policies. The scal policy is as-
sumed to be aimed at a balanced budget. So we have the following rule
PGtGt = PtTt (2.41)
As for the scale of government, we assume that the total expenditure of government
in the steady state amounts to a xed proportion of the total output in steady state.
Parameter g governs the ratio:
G = gY (2.42)
where for G and Y the time subscript t is dropped to indicate a steady state value of
them.
Government spending is assumed to be subject to a scal policy shock:
G^t = GG^t 1 + "Gt (2.43)
We further assume that the government buys both traded and non-traded goods. And
the shares are consistent with that of private spending, i.e. a constant proportion of the
total expenditure  goes to non-traded goods and the remaining proportion 1  goes to
traded goods. We assume that the government only buys domestic traded goods. So we
have:
GNt = Gt (2.44)
GHt = (1  )Gt (2.45)
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-type rule. By assumption, the deviation of
the chosen interest rate from its steady state can be broken down into terms of interest
rate smoothing, ination feedback, output gap feedback and monetary shock respectively.
In particular, the rule takes the form:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R "t

 Yt
Y
Y #1 R
rrt (2.46)
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where Rt
R
denotes the deviation of the interest rate from its steady state. R is the
degree of interest rate smoothing.  and Y are respectively feedback parameters of
ination and output gap. And rr stands for a monetary shock which follows the process
of brrt = rr brrt 1 + "rr.
2.6 Financial markets
In this subsection, let us dene the rate of return for the assets available in the inter-
national nancial market. As mentioned, both countries can issue equities and nominal
bond. For home and foreign equities, we assume that they represent claims on the prot
made by the rms in the issuer country. The gross (real) rate of return for home and
foreign equities are thus given by:
r1t =
t + Z1t
Z1t 1
(2.47)
r2t =
t Qt + Z2t
Z2t 1
(2.48)
where t = Mt + Ft + t and t = 

Mt + 

Ft + 

t are the total prots of rms,
i.e. the prots belonging to intermediate and nal goods rms of both traded and non-
traded goods sectors plus labour unions, in the two countries. Z1t and Z2t are the real
prices of home and foreign equities. Qt = (St  P t ) =Pt in Eq.(2:48) is the real exchange
rate representing the price of foreign consumption basket in terms of home consumption
basket. The rate of return of the foreign equity r2t is dened in terms of home basket and
is comparable to r1t.
For the home and foreign bonds, we assume that they represent claims on one unit of
currency per period in the issuer country. The gross (real) rates of return for them are
thus given by:
r3t =
1=Pt + Z3t
Z1t 1
(2.49)
r4t =
(1=P t ) Qt + Z4t
Z4t 1
(2.50)
where 1=Pt and (1=P t )Q denote real payo¤s of one unit of home and foreign bonds. Again,
Q is used to convert the foreign payo¤ into terms of the home consumption basket.
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2.7 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all markets should clear. These include market clearing in the goods
market, the labour market and asset markets.
In the goods market, for the non-traded sector, we should have
YNt = DNt + Gt (2.50)
where DN is the private demand for home non-tradables and G is the public spending
on them. Note that as explained there is no demand coming from the foreign country for
home non-tradables.
For the traded sector, we have
YTt = DHt +D

Ht + (1  )Gt (2.51)
where DH1 and DH2 are the private demands for home tradables from the home and
foreign countries, whose formulae are given by Eqs.(2:14) and (2:16), and (1  )G is the
public spending on home tradables.
Aggregating the goods demands across sectors leads to the total demand for goods
Yt = YNt + YTt (2.52)
In the labour market, the total labour supply L is made up of that of traded sectors
LT and that of non-traded sectors LN
Lt = LTt + LNt (2.53)
In the foreign country, these conditions are similar.
In asset markets, all assets are in net supply of zero, so
it + 

it = 0 (2.54)
for i = 1; 2; 3; 4. Note that i is an index of assets and the s with asterisk are foreign
holdings. By the market clearing conditions of assets, once (steady-state) asset holdings
of home country are obtained, those of foreign country are simply i =  i. So in what
follows, we only focus on the solutions of home portfolio choices, i.e. the is.
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3 Optimal portfolios in the general model
After specifying the details of the model, in this section, we are ready to discuss the
determination of the optimal portfolios, i.e. the is. We rst derive the optimality
condition that can be used to tie down the is from the Euler equations. It turns out
that the is are determined by rst-order behaviour of the cross-country consumption
di¤erential and asset excess returns. We approximate the budget constraints of the two
countries and apply them to the optimality condition to yield is as variance-covariance
ratios. The correlation and variability e¤ects are dened and derived following the
literature, which provide useful hints about the way of how the optimal portfolios are
structured.
3.1 Optimality condition
As noted in the previous section, the optimal portfolio choices are determined by equation
set (2:6) and its foreign counterpart. In the home country, Eq.(2:6) gives us the following
three restrictions that need to be satised:
E

C Xt+1rit+1

= E

C Xt+1r4t+1

(3.1)
for i = 1; 2; 3. Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011) (and also Tille and Wincoop,
2010), to obtain the zero-order is, at least second-order approximations of the portfolio
conditions are required. So we approximate the above conditions in a standard way up
to second-order accuracy. Combined with the foreign approximated conditions, we can
arrive at the following covariance condition
E
h
C^Xt+1   C^Xt+1   Q^t+1=
 brixt+1i = 0 +O  3 (3.2)
where, except for r^ixt+1 which is dened as (r^it+1   r^4t+1), all other variables with hats rep-
resent log deviations from their steady states. For example, C^Xt+1 = log[(CXt+1   CX) =CX ]
where CX is steady-state CXt. C^Xt+1 and Q^t+1 are dened similarly.
Eq.(3:2) can serve as the condition to tie down the is for i = 1; 2; 3. Note by
this equation, the is are determined by two rst-order behaviours. There are C^DXt+1 =
C^Xt+1   C^Xt+1   Q^t+1=

, which is referred to as the cross-country consumption dif-
ferential (with habit formation), and r^xt+1, which is referred to as the excess returns of
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asset i over asset 4 which is the numeraire asset in the model. At the optimum, the
is are chosen so that the covariance between the two is zero, or the two are orthogonal,
which indicates the optimal portfolios as hedging vehicles smoothing relative consumption
uctuations through generating relative asset returns.
Once 1 to 3 are derived from Eq.(3:2), 4 can be obtained by the fact of 4 =
F   (1 + 2 + 3) where F is steady-state NFA in the home country. Because in this
paper, we assume that the steady state autarky interest rates are equalized across countries
r = r = 1

. There is no reason for capital ows to particular country in net terms. Steady
state net foreign assets in equilibrium is thus zero, i.e. F = 0.
3.2 Approximating budget constraints
Obviously, C^DXt is endogenous and it depends on the optimal portfolio is in the model.
Most basically, consumptions link to portfolios through budget constraints. By writing
out the links between them, we can establish expressions of portfolios explicitly instead
of implicitly as in Eq.(3:2). This procedure is usually very useful in providing us with
intuitions on which kind of motive drives the emergence of the observed portfolios, i.e.
the motive to hedge away certain income risks. In this subsection, we obtain the links by
approximating the budget constraints of countries. In the next subsection, we derive the
portfolios as a variance-covariance ratio representing them explicitly.
Let us start with the home budget constraint, Eq.(2:3), which can be rewritten as
Ft = 
0
t 1rxt + r4Ft 1 + Yct   Ct (3.3)
where we dene portfolio vector 0t 1 = [1t 1 2t 1 3t 1], excess vector rxt = [r1xt r2xt r3xt]
0
and disposable income Yct = wtPtLt + t + t   Tt.
First-order approximating the equation around the steady-state yields
C^t = Y^ct +
1
c
~0r^xt +
1
c
1

F^t 1   1
c
F^t (3.4)
where Y^ct = log[(Yct   Yc) =Yc] and C^t = log[(Ct   C) =C]. Because in steady state,
F = 0, F^t is dened here as deviation of Ft from its steady state (of zero) as a percentage
of equilibrium income Y instead of F , i.e. F^t = log[Ft=Y ]. Besides, we dene ~0 = 1Y 
0
and r^xt = [r1xt r2xt r3xt]
0. c is the steady-state ratio of consumption to income c = C=Y .
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The budget constraint in the foreign country is
F t
Qt
=
1
Qt
 
0t 1rxt + r4F

t 1

+ Y ct   Ct (3.5)
Note that exchange rate appears in the constraint because all asset returns are in terms
of the home consumption basket while foreign consumption and disposable income are in
terms of foreign consumption basket.
Similarly, approximating this constraint yields
C^t = Y^

ct +
1
cQ
~0r^xt +
1
cQ
1

F^ t 1  
1
cQ
F^ t (3.6)
where variables are dened analogously.
Notice that in a two-country world we have F t =  Ft so
F^ t =  
Y
Y 
F^t
By the conditions of asset market clearing, we have
~ =

Y 
=
 
Y
Y
Y 
=   Y
Y 
~
Making use of these facts, we can rewrite Eq.(3:6) as
C^t = Y^

ct  
Y
Y 
1
cQ
~0r^xt   Y
Y 
1
cQ
1

F^t 1 +
Y
Y 
1
cQ
F^t (3.7)
3.3 Variance-covariance representation of portfolios
In this subsection, we represent ~ as a variance-covariance ratio. For convenience, approx-
imated home and foreign budget constraints that were obtained above are put together
as follows
C^t = Y^ct +
1
c
~0r^xt +
1
c
1

F^t 1   1
c
F^t
C^t = Y^

ct  
Y
Y 
1
cQ
~0r^xt   Y
Y 
1
cQ
1

F^t 1 +
Y
Y 
1
cQ
F^t
According to Eq.(2:2), i.e. CXt+1 = Ct+1   hCt, we have
(1  h) C^Xt+1 = C^t+1   hC^t
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which can be used to rewrite C^DXt+1 as
C^DXt+1 =
1
1  h

C^t+1   hC^t

  1
1  h

C^t+1   hC^t

  1

Q^t+1
With the expressions of consumption behaviours above, it follows that
1X
i=0
iC^DXt+1+i =
1X
i=0
i
24 11 h C^t+1+i   hC^t+i  11 h C^t+1+i   hC^t+i
 1

Q^t+1+i
35
=
X
i

1
1  h

Y^ct+1+i   hY^ct+i

  1
1  h

Y^ ct+1+i   hY^ ct+i

+
X
i

 1  2~0r^xt+1+i    2  2~0r^xt+i   1

Q^t+1+i

+ t:i:
where
 1 =

1
1  h
1
2c
+
1
1  h
Y
Y 
1
2cQ

 2 =

h
1  h
1
2c
+
h
1  h
Y
Y 
1
2cQ

and t:i: denotes terms of irrelevance (whose covariance with r^xt+1 is 0). The summation
is equivalent to
1X
i=0
iC^DXt+1+i =
1
(1  )C^
D
Xt+1
=
1X
i=0
i
"
1 h
1 h Y^ct+1+i   1 h

1 h Y^

ct+1+i
+  2~0r^xt+1+i   1Q^t+1+i
#
+ t:i:
or
C^DXt+1 = (1  ) ( yt+1 +   2~0r^xt+1 + t:i:) (3.8)
where
 yt+1 =
1X
i=0
i

1  h
1  h Y^ct+1+i  
1  h
1  h Y^

ct+1+i  
1

Q^t+1+i

(3.9)
denotes the sum of discounted expected uctuations in relative disposable incomes and
 =  1    2 (3.10)
denotes a wedge whose value depends on the severity of the habit friction and the degree
of country di¤erences in the general model.
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Putting Eq.(3:8) back into Eq.(3:2) leads to
Et fr^xt+1 ( yt+1 +   2~0r^xt+1)g = 0
or
~i =   1
2
cov
 
yt+1; r^xt+1

var (r^xt+1)
(3.11)
where ~i for i = 1; 2; 3 is element of ~. yt+1 =  yt+1 Et yt+1 is the sum of discounted
expected innovations in relative disposable incomes while r^xt+1 = r^xt+1   Etr^xt+1 is the
innovations in excess return of assets1. Eq.(3:11) states that the optimal portfolios ~
depends on how the innovations in discounted expected relative disposable incomes co-
vary with that in excess return of assets. The equation coincides with Eq.(24) of Devereux
et al. (2014) if we ignore the presence of  .2 While in Devereux et al. (2014),  collapses
(into 1=C) because the two countries are entirely symmetric and they do not consider
the situation where households form habits, in the current model we are interested in the
portfolio choices in an asymmetric world. And to consider possible asymmetry in habit
persistence between developing and developed countries and its e¤ects on portfolio choices,
habit formation is taken into account. So  emerges as one measure of how ~ di¤ers in the
asymmetric model from that in a symmetric model. While  has a multiplicative e¤ect
on the size of portfolio holdings, the fundamental force underlying the determination of ~
is essentially the same as that in the symmetric model, i.e. householdsmotive to hedge
against those risks that disturb their desired smooth schedule of relative consumption.
Eq.(3:11) makes sense given that relative consumption is always supported by relative
disposable income.
3.4 Correlation and variability e¤ects
We now dene and derive the correlationand variabilitye¤ects. These e¤ects provide
a useful decomposition of the portfolio expressions which will be used in the analysis
1Note that Etr^xt+1 = 0 is derived from the rst-order approximation of Eq.(3:1). Both Devereux and
Sutherland (2011) and Tille and Wincoop (2010) also share this property. Later on in Eq.(3:27) of next
chapter, we show in more detail how this can be the case in a similar context.
2Except that yt+1 is also dened in a slightly di¤erent way. Specically, in their paper, yt+1 is
multiplied by steady-state consumption C which is equalized across countries in their model. The degree
of asymmetry in the model of this chapter is instead reected in  here.
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reported below. By Eq.(3:11),  is the same across ~is, i.e. elements in ~. If there
are di¤erences among the ~is they must come from the di¤erences among the variance-
covariance ratios. The correlation and variability e¤ects will provide some clues about
the causes of these di¤erences across assets.
Note that the ~is in Eq.(3:11) can be re-written as
~1 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^1xt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1
StD (r^1xt+1j r^2xt+1; r^3xt+1) (3.12)
~2 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^2xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1
StD (r^2xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^3xt+1) (3.13)
~3 =   1
2
corr
 
yt+1; r^3xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1
 StD  yt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1
StD (r^3xt+1j r^1xt+1; r^2xt+1) (3.14)
According to above formulae, the signs of asset holdings are determined by the cor-
relation between relative disposable income and the excess return of the asset condi-
tional on the excess returns of other assets, i.e. corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

where to
ease notation we dene r^ ixt+1 as a vector consisting of all elements of r^xt+1 except for
r^ixt+1. In other words, the short or long positions of asset holdings depend on the (condi-
tional) hedging properties of related assets. Suppose for asset i, given the presence of the
other assets, its excess return co-moves negatively with the relative disposable income, so
corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

< 0. This means after a shock, householdsrelative income
moves in one direction while the asset yields returns that move in the o¤setting direction.
The asset is able to stabilize householdsrelative consumption. In this sense the asset is
deemed as a good hedge and will be held in long position. Otherwise, if its excess return
co-move positively with the relative incomes corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

> 0, holding the
asset would exaggerate the e¤ects of the risks. This means that in order to provide a
good hedge the asset will be held in a short position by households.
Coming back to our model, ~1 and ~3 are gross holdings of home assets which are
supplied by the home country by default, so they are expected to be negative. That is
to say, the two associated correlations are expected to be positive. ~2 and ~4 are gross
(and also net) holdings of foreign assets, so they are expected to be positive. That is to
say, the two associated correlations are expected to be negative. (~4s expression can be
obtained if another asset, say asset 2, is chosen as the numeraire asset. The representation
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is analogous. Note that the choice of numeraire asset does not matter in the sense that
they all yield the same portfolio solutions ~.)
The size of asset holdings are determined by both corr
 
yt+1; r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1

and the
ratio of
StD(yt+1j r^ ixt+1)
StD(r^ixt+1j r^ ixt+1) . Following the literature, from now on, we refer them respec-
tively as the correlationand variabilitye¤ects. The two e¤ects have very intuitive
interpretations when it comes to a¤ecting the size of ~is.
The size of the ~is positively depend on the correlation e¤ect. This is because the
higher is the conditional correlation (in absolute value), the closer is the co-movement
between the relative disposable income and excess return, the more signicant is the role
of asset in serving as a good hedge against risks. So the households desire to hold a more
substantial amount of it, positively or negatively. The e¤ect can be thought of as a quality
e¤ect, i.e. the assets which are more e¢ cient in hedging (or exaggerating) risks will be
bought (or sold) more. The correlation e¤ect measures how relevant are the assets. The
more relevant they are in risk-hedging, the more important they are in portfolios.
The size of the ~is also depends positively on the variability e¤ect as well. Note that
the latter is the ratio of the conditional standard deviation of relative disposable income to
that of excess return. It tells us how much the volatility of the relative disposable income
is relative to that of the excess return. While the former volatility provides us with a
measure of total amount of risks to be hedged against, the latter provides a measure of
the amount of hedging that is made available by holding one unit of certain asset. A
higher value of the ratio implies that more units of the asset is required. So the e¤ect
can be thought of as a quantity e¤ect, i.e. more income volatility requires more units of
hedging.
In the case of two-way capital ows, the developing country imports equities while
exports bonds in net terms. If we dene the net holding of equities and bonds as, respec-
tively, ~E = ~1 + ~2 and ~B = ~3 + ~4, then two-way capital ows implies ~E < 0 and
~B > 0. Because ~1 and ~3 have negative signs, so they are equivalent to the pattern of
j~1j > j~2j and j~3j < j~4j in optimal portfolios, i.e. the size of ~1 is larger than that
of ~2 while the size of ~3 is less than that of ~4. Applying the above analysis, we know
that this pattern can be the result of a certain combination of correlation and variability
e¤ects. As a central analysis of this paper, in Section 5 we will assess the e¤ect of various
asymmetries between countries in generating the two-way capital ows. The correlation
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and variability e¤ects we dene here will provide useful devices in order to understand
the ndings there.
To end this section, we have to remind that neither Eq(3:11) nor Eqs.(3:12  14) are
full reduced forms because as the determinants of ~ in Eq.(3:2), the second moments in
these formulae are also in themselves depending on ~. In other words, both Eq.(3:2) and
Eqs.(3:11  14) indicates ~ as a xed point except that the former denes it implicitly
while the latter explicitly and thus provide intuitions for the results. To sum up, we apply
Devereux and Sutherland (2011)s method to Eq.(3:2) to obtain ~ and make use of this
~ and Eqs.(3:12) to decompose portfolios into correlation and variability e¤ects. In the
sections below, we analyse the model numerically.
4 Model simulation: Symmetric case
We will compute the numerical solution of equilibrium portfolios by simulating the model.
As a benchmark, the two countries are rstly calibrated symmetrically in this section. We
choose parameter values at their standard levels of calibration in the literature which are
basically descriptions of advanced economies or/and from the estimates that are based on
U:S: data. So we will see what the portfolios will look like without country asymmetry.
In the next section, we will take into account the existence of a developing country by
considering asymmetric simulations.
4.1 Parameterization
The frequency is assumed to be quarterly which is consistent with the literature on busi-
ness cycles. The discount factor  is set at 0:99 which implies an annual interest rate
of 4 percent. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded goods is
set at  = 1:5 which conforms to that of Backus et al. (1994). As for the values of the
share of home traded goods in traded consumption basket , the share of nontraded goods
in the total consumption basket  and the elasticity of substitution between traded and
nontraded goods , we choose them based on an average of values used in Benigno and
Thoenissen (2008), Corsetti et al. (2008) and Stockman and Tesar (1995). The elasticity
of substitution among individual nal goods is set at 10 which implies an approximate 10
percent price mark-up over marginal cost.
24
For the production technology, the labour share of income a is calibrated to approx-
imately 2=3 which is common in the literature and consistent with U:S: data. Based on
the same grounds, the share of government spending in total expenditure g is assumed to
be 0:18. The depreciation rate of capital  is set at 0:025 implying an annual depreciation
rate of capital of 10%. The coe¢ cient of investment adjustment cost  is chosen as 0:25
so that the variance of total investment is approximately 3 times the variance of GDP
which is consistent with U:S: data.
The values for the remaining parameters come from the median estimates by Smets
and Wouters (2007) based on the data of the U:S: economy. These parameters include
those related to preference (such as risk aversion , labour supply elasticity  and habit
persistence h), Calvo price-setting, the monetary policy rule and structural shocks. Note
by the parameter values, the U:S: households feature a persistent habit formation with
h = 0:7. The price and wage adjust infrequently and the average duration of a price
is about 3 quarters,  = 0:66 and & = 0:7. In addition, the price and wage index to
previous levels to some degree and the degree of wage indexation is higher than that of
price, ! = 0:24 while $ = 0:58. The interest rate is highly persistent with a persistence
of R = 0:81. The related feedback coe¢ cients of monetary policy with regard to ination
and output gap are respectively 2 and 0:1. The table 2:1 lists all values of parameters
used in the benchmark calibration.
4.2 Symmetric case: Benchmark
Table 2:2 reports the result for equilibrium portfolios (divided by Y ) under the bench-
mark calibration. The home householdsholdings of home and foreign equity are  2:2985
and 2:2985 (times of steady-state income) while their holdings of home and foreign bonds
are  0:7756 and 0:7756 (times of steady-state income). The home demands of home as-
sets ~1 and ~3 are negative reecting the fact that the home country is net supplier of
home assets. The home demands of foreign assets ~2 and ~4 are positive reecting the
fact that the home country is net demander of foreign assets. The home net holdings of
equities and bonds are both equal to zero ~E = ~B = 0 because the two countries are
the same. In the light of portfolio decomposition, the symmetry of the countries implies
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Description Variable values
Calvo price rigidity parameter  = 0:66
Calvo wage rigidity parameter & = 0:70
Price indexation ! = 0:24
Wage indexation $ = 0:58
Discount factor  = 0:99
Habit persistence h = 0:70
Risk aversion coe¢ cient  = 1:38
Labour supply elasticity  = 2:83
Share of home traded goods in traded basket  = 0:58
Share of nontraded goods in consumption  = 0:40
Substitutability between traded goods  = 1:50
Substitutability between traded and nontraded goods  = 0:45
Substitutability among individual goods ' = 10
Labour share of income in traded goods sector aT = 0:67
Labour share of income in nontraded goods sector aN = 0:67
Capital depreciation rate  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost  = 0:25
Share of government spending g = 0:18
Interest rate smoothing factor in Taylor rule R = 0:81
Ination feedback in Taylor rule  = 2
Output feedback in Taylor rule Y = 0:1
Pricing strategy  = 0
Persistence of technology shock in traded sector TT1 = 0:95, TT2 = 0
Variance of technology shock in traded sector T = 0:0045
Persistence of technology shock in non-traded sector NN1 = 0:95, NN2 = 0
Variance of technology shock in non-traded sector N = 0:0045
Cross terms of technology shocks TN1 = TN2 = 0:60
NT1 = NT2 = 0
Monetary policy shock rr = 0:15, rr = 0:0024
Government spending shock G = 0:97, G = 0:0053
Mark-up shock V = 0:89, V = 0:002
Labour supply shock  = 0:90,  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost shock  = 0:71,  = 0:0045
Table 1: Parameter values: Symmetric case
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  2:2985
Foreign equity ~2 = 2:2985
Home bond ~3 =  0:7756
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:7756
Table 2: Optimal portfolio choices: Symmetric case
that the correlation and variability e¤ects of the same type of assets across countries are
also equal to each other in absolute value. (The correlation e¤ects have opposite signs
because of di¤erent country identity.) As references, the value of  here is 1:6818. The
correlation and variability e¤ects associated with ~1 are respectively 0:1763 and 43:8628
while those associated with ~2 are  0:1763 and 43:8628. For bond assets, the two e¤ects
associated with ~3 are respectively 0:4156 and 6:2776 while those associated with ~4 are
 0:4156 and 6:2776. One can verify that these values are consistent with the optimal
portfolios via Eqs.(3:12  14). It also follows by inspection of the e¤ects that the (condi-
tional) correlation between the innovation in the equity excess return and that of relative
disposable income is relatively low while the correlation between the innovation in the
bond excess return and that of relative disposable income is relatively high. The bond
assetsreturn moves more closely with relative disposable income in the model. According
to the analysis in the last section, more sizable bond positions should be held in optimal
portfolios due to the relative correlation e¤ect. In contrast, the (conditional) variability
e¤ect belonging to equity assets is relatively high while that belonging to bond assets is
relatively low. Due to this relative variability e¤ect, however, more sizable equity posi-
tions should be held in optimal portfolios. It turns out that the relative variability e¤ect
dominates the correlation e¤ect, so in the end we observe that the size of equity positions
outweighs that of bond positions.
The key information conveyed by the benchmark calibration is that the pattern of two-
way capital ows cannot arise in a symmetric model. There must be some asymmetries
between the two countries which make this happen. By design, our model is general
enough to allow for assessments of various asymmetries impact on the capital ows.
The next section is thus dedicated to such assessments in which course the result of the
symmetric simulation in this section is always used as a comparison.
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5 The two-way capital ows: developing vs devel-
oped countries
Now we turn to consider asymmetric situations in this section. The integration of de-
veloping country into the world economy is considered. To distinguish, in what follows,
the home country is viewed as developing country while the foreign country is viewed
as developed country. Because it is very likely the case that between the two types of
countries various asymmetries coexist at the same time, we take two steps to investigate
their impacts. First of all, we consider the individual e¤ect of each asymmetry on net
portfolio positions and two-way capital ows. Through the exercise, we will know whether
the asymmetry considered matters for the emergence of the pattern of two-way capital
ows. Moreover, if we nd that an asymmetry does generate a two-way capital ow we
also examine the question of in which direction the asymmetry plays its role (i.e. does
it cause equity capital to ow to or from the developing country). The correlation and
variability e¤ects will also be traced during the course of the analysis in order to uncover
the main channels in operation. After checking these individual e¤ects, we put all asym-
metries together into the same picture. By picking di¤erent sets of parameter values for
the two countries, we simulate a fully asymmetric model mimicking a world of developing
and developed countries that di¤er along multiple dimensions. We will thus check the
composite e¤ect of all asymmetries on portfolio choices.
5.1 Asymmetric cases: Single factors
To separate the e¤ects of the asymmetries from each other, in this subsection, we examine
them one by one. The process is as follows. We treat the foreign country as a control
group and x all foreign country parameter values at the benchmark levels. For each
asymmetry, in the home country, we change the value of the associated parameter over a
range around the benchmark value. Our target is to see how the net foreign equity and
bond positions, ~E and ~B, respond to such changes.
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Figure 2: Labour intensity of technology aT and aN
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5.1.1 Labour intensity
As the rst experiment, we look at labour intensity of technology. The parameter char-
acterizing this aspect is a. In the experiment, the foreign labour share a is xed at the
standard value of 0:67 while the home share a ranges from 0:55 to 0:79. The results are
depicted as Figure 2. In this gure, panels (a) and (b) demonstrate the variations in ~E
and ~B respectively. At the horizontal middle, ~E and ~B are both equal to zero which
corresponds to the benchmark case of a = a = 0:67. To the right hand side of the point,
a > a. We observe ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. That is to say, when the labour share is higher
in the home country than in the foreign country, the home country holds a negative net
equity position and a positive net bond position, i.e. there are two-way capital ows in
the form observed for developing countries. Moreover, as the magnitude of the asymme-
try grows, i.e. when a is much higher than a, the pattern in capital ows become more
signicant, ~E and ~B both increase in absolute size.
To explore why this is the case, we decompose the portfolios into associated correlation
and variability e¤ects, whose results are documented in the remaining panels of the gure.
Since we will present the results of other asymmetries in the same way, some explanation
on how to read these gures will be useful. Panels (c) and (e) report the correlation
and variability e¤ects for equities (in absolute value), i.e. ~1 and ~2. Panels (d) and (e)
do the same for bonds, i.e. ~3 and ~4. Because the variability e¤ect is a ratio between
two volatilities, the latter are also displayed as bottom panels, i.e. in panels (g) and (i)
are the conditional volatility of relative disposable income and that of the excess return
belonging to the two equities while in panels (h) and (j) are conditional volatility of
relative disposable income and that of the excess return belonging to the two bonds. In
all these panels, solid lines are used for home assets while dashed lines for foreign assets.
According to (c) and (d), ~E decreases because both the correlation and variability
e¤ects associated with ~1 are higher than those of ~2. As is shown, as a increases, the
correlation e¤ects of both equities increase, which implies an enhancement of equitiesrole
as a good hedge against income risks. However, the increase in the correlation e¤ect for
home equity is more signicant. On the other hand, the variability e¤ects of both equities
decrease, which implies lower gross positions are required to hedge against risks. (This is
in turn due to a decrease in the volatility of relative incomes while there is an increase
in the volatility of asset returns based on the facts in panels (g) and (i)). However, the
30
decrease in the variability e¤ect of the home equity is less signicant. Both facts point to
a relative rise in the size of ~1 which favours presence of a negative ~E.
For ~B, we look at panels (d) and (f). As a increases, the correlation e¤ect of ~3
decreases while that of ~4 increases, which favours presence of a positive ~B. On the
other hand, the variability e¤ect of ~3 increases while that of ~4 decreases. (Based on the
facts in panels (h) and (j), the rise in ~3 is because the associated volatility of relative
income decreases less than that of the asset return while the decline in ~4 is because the
associated volatility of relative income increases less than that of the asset return.) So
the change in the variability e¤ect favours the presence of a negative ~B instead. It turns
out that in the race between the two e¤ects the former one wins out and ~B becomes
positive.
5.1.2 Nominal rigidity
We consider both price and wage rigidities in this subsection.
First, for the degree of price stickiness , we set the foreign value at the standard value
of 0:66 while we vary the home value from 0:54 to 0:78. As is shown in Figure 3, on either
side of the middle point of  =  = 0:66, the pattern of two-way capital ows emerges
with ~E < 0 while ~B > 0; so the home country has a negative net position in equities and
a positive net position in bonds in the way observed in the data for developing countries.
It is rather surprising that, in the case illustrated in Figure 3, the direction of the
asymmetry in price rigidity appears to be unimportant in generating an outcome with
~E < 0 while ~B > 0: To test the sensitivity of this result, we conduct further experi-
ments in which  (i.e. the foreign degree of price rigidity) is di¤erent from 0:66. These
experiments are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. These gures show the e¤ects of varying
 on ~E and ~B for a high value of 
 (Figure 4) and a low value of  (Figure 5). By
Smets and Woutersestimation, the value of  lies in a condence interval of 0:56 and
0:74 so we use these two extremes as values for : These two gures show that in general
the e¤ects of  and  on ~E and ~B are quite complicated. Both gures show that the
plots for ~E and ~B cross at two values of : For either high values of  or low values
of  the pattern of two-way capital ows is observed with ~E < 0 and ~B > 0: But for
intermediate values of  the opposite result emerges.
From the last paragraph, the impact of asymmetry in  on two-way capital ows is
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Figure 3: Nominal (price) rigidity 
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in general complicated in terms of signs. However, in terms of magnitude, it turns out
that the asymmetry in  is always a factor of little importance. The sizes of ~E and ~B
under asymmetric cases are generally below 0:01. This is consistent with the results of the
decomposition into correlation and variability e¤ects. The other panels in Figure 3 show
that the conditional second moments that are associated with home and foreign assets
are generally very similar regardless of the value of .
Turning now to the degree of wage stickiness &, we set & at the standard value of 0:7
while we vary & from 0:58 to 0:82. The result is shown in Figure 6. It is obvious that
when & > &, ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. The more severe is the problem of wage stickiness
in the home country, the more signicant is the pattern of two-way capital ows in the
model. For di¤erent foreign values, the result is robust.
When & > &, a rise in & increases the correlation e¤ect of equities to approximately
the same degree (see panel (c)). It also increases the variability e¤ect, however, with that
belonging to ~1 more signicantly according to panel (e). (By panel (i), this is in turn
because the excess return of the home equity becomes relatively less volatile.) This leads
to ~E < 0.
A rise in & moves the correlation and variability e¤ects of bonds as well. While the
correlation e¤ect associated with ~3 is higher than that of ~4, its variability e¤ect is lower
than that of ~4. It turns out that the correlation e¤ect dominates the variability e¤ect so
~B > 0.
As was seen with the asymmetry in price stickiness, the pattern of two-way capital
ows is insensitive to the asymmetry in wage stickiness, with the sizes of ~E and ~B
under asymmetric calibrations being generally below 0:01 (in panels (a) and (b)) so we
can conclude that asymmetries in the degree of both wage and price stickiness are of little
importance in generating large two-way capital ows.
5.1.3 Home good bias
The parameter that determines the steady state share of home traded goods in the traded
consumption basket, ; governs the severity of home good bias. The higher is the value
of , the more severe is home good bias. We set  at the standard value of 0:58 and
vary  from 0:46 to 0:70. Figure 7 reports the results for this experiment. From panels
(a) and (b), when  < , we obtain ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. So a less severe home good bias
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Figure 6: Nominal (wage) rigidity &
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Figure 7: Home good bias 
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in the home country will lead to two-way capital ows, with the home country holding a
net negative position in equities and a net positive position in bonds (as observed in the
data for developing countries).
Panel (c) tells us that when  < , the relative return on home equity is more closely
correlated with relative income than that of the foreign equity, which implies a relatively
large absolute position of ~1. This is the reason for a negative ~E. By panel (e), the
relative variability e¤ect actually works in the other direction. When  < , the relative
returns conditional on r 1x and r 2x have the same volatility (panel (g)), but because the
excess return of home equity has a relatively high volatility compared to that of the foreign
equity (panel (i)), the variability e¤ect is lower (panel (e)), which entails a relatively small
position of ~1. This partially o¤sets the relative correlation e¤ect.
For bond positions, when  < , the relative variability e¤ect between home and
foreign assets are similar to that of equity assets. The variability e¤ect associated with
home bond is relatively low (panel (f)), which entails a relatively small position of ~3
(and a relatively large position of ~4 correspondingly). This is the reason for a positive
~B. The relative correlation e¤ects between ~3 and ~4 are approximately zero, i.e. the
lines representing the two e¤ects overlap each other (panel (d)).
5.1.4 Trade openness
Trade openness can be represented by the share of nontraded goods in the total consump-
tion basket, which is determined by the parameter . The higher is the value of , the
less open is trade in the country. We set  at the standard value of 0:4 and vary  from
0:28 to 0:52. As is shown in the Figure 8, the result is that as the home country has a
smaller share of nontraded goods in the consumption basket, the more pronounced are
two-way capital ows (panels (a) and (b)) i.e. where ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. The pattern
therefore resembles that of home bias shown above.
In terms of decomposition into correlation and variability e¤ects, we observe that,
when  < , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is always higher than that of ~2
(panel (c)). This gives rise to a large position of ~1 and a negative ~E. In addition, both
the conditional volatility of relative income and that of the excess return associated with
home equity are higher than those associated with foreign equity (panels (g) and (i)). But
the volatility of the excess return rises more than that of relative income. This generates
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Figure 8: Trade openness 
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Figure 9: Substitutability between home and foreign tradables 
a lower variability e¤ect of ~1 compared to that of ~2 (panel (e)), which partially o¤sets
the relative correlation e¤ect.
For bond positions, when  < , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~3 is always
greater than that associated with ~4 (panel (d)), which implies a relatively large position
of ~3 and a negative ~B. However, the variability e¤ect associated with ~3 is always below
that associated with ~4 (panel (f)), which, in contrast, implies a relatively small position
of ~3 and a positive ~B. The importance of the relative variability e¤ect quantitatively
outweighs that of the relative correlation e¤ect. This justies the presence of a positive
~B.
5.1.5 Household preferences
In this subsection, we consider asymmetries associated with two parameters of households
preferences. These are the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables,
; and the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables, .
For the former,  is set at 1:5 while  ranges from 1 to 2. The result is shown in
Figure 9. It is obvious that there is no e¤ect of this asymmetry on ~E and ~B. The
asymmetry associated with  seems to be an irrelevant factor when it comes to two-way
39
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
-0.2
0
0.2
(a) Net f oreign equity
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
(c) Corr(zy,r1x|r-1x ) & Corr(zy,r2x|r-2x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
43.8
43.9
44
44.1
(e) StD(zy|r-1x )/StD(r1x|r-1x ) & StD(zy|r-2x )/StD(r2x|r-2x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
0.051
0.052
0.053
0.054
(g) StD(zy|r-1x ) & StD(zy|r-2x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
1.18
1.2
1.22
x 10-3
(i) StD(r1x|r-1x ) & StD(r2x|r-2x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
-0.2
0
0.2
(b) Net f oreign bond
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
(d) Corr( zy,r3x|r-3x ) & Corr(zy,r4x|r-4x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
6
6.2
6.4
6.6
(f ) StD(zy|r-3x )/StD(r3x|r-3x ) & StD(zy|r-4x )/StD(r4x|r-4x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
0.054
0.056
0.058
(h) StD(zy|r-3x ) & StD(zy|r-4x )
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
8.8
8.9
9
x 10-3
(j) StD(r3x|r-3x ) & StD(r4x|r-4x )
Figure 10: Substitutability between tradables and non-tradables 
40
capital ows.
For the latter parameter,  is set at 0:45 while  ranges from 0:33 to 0:57. It is clear
from Figure 10 that as  increases, the portfolio pattern displays two-way capital ows
where the home country has a negative net position in equities and a positive net position
in bonds in line with observed data on developing countries. The higher is  relative to
, the more signicant are the two-way capital ows.
When  > , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is greater than that associated
with ~2 (panel (c)), which implies that home equity as a hedge against income risks is
relatively superior to foreign equity. This tends to generate a negative ~E. However, the
variability e¤ect associated with ~1 is less than that associated with ~2 (panel (e)), which
implies, given the presence the other assets, it requires a relatively smaller ~1 to hedge
against the related income risks. This tends to generate a positive ~E. It turns out that
the relative correlation e¤ect is more important, so ~E < 0 is observed.
For bond positions, when  > , the correlation e¤ect associated with ~3 is below
that associated with ~4 (panel (d)) which tends to generate a positive ~B. Moreover, the
variability e¤ect associated with ~3 is below that associated with ~4 (panel (f)), which
tends to reinforce the relative correlation e¤ect in generating a positive ~B.
5.1.6 Capital adjustment costs
It is possible that marginal costs of capital adjustment in developing and developed coun-
tries are not equal. What is the consequence of this asymmetry on country portfolios? In
our model, this can be determined by manipulating the parameter  . We set   at its
benchmark level of 0:25 and vary  from 0:13 to 0:37. The results are displayed in Figure
11. By panels (a) and (b), when  <  , we have ~E < 0 and ~B > 0. Thus the lower
is  relative to  , the more signicant is the pattern of two-way capital ows (with the
home country holdings a negative net position in equities and a positive net position in
bonds).
By panel (c), ~E is negative mainly because the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1
is above that associated with ~2. The variability e¤ect associated with ~1 is, by panel
(e) however, below that associated with ~2. This is in turn because even though the
conditional relative income and excess return of home equity both are more volatile than
that of foreign equity, the volatility in excess return dominates.
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By panel (d) and (f), the correlation and variability e¤ect associated with ~3 are both
below that associated with ~4. They combine to lower the size of ~3 comparing to that
of ~4, which explains why ~B is positive. Besides, by panels (h) and (j), the relatively
low variability e¤ect of the home bond is due to the relative low volatility of disposable
income and relative high volatility of excess return when  <  .
5.1.7 Monetary policy
Monetary policies in developing and developed countries may be conducted in di¤erent
ways. In this subsection, we explore the possibility that they put di¤erent weights on
ination and output gap stabilization. This is captured by asymmetries associated with
the two feedback coe¢ cients of Taylor rule in the model, i.e. ination feedback coe¢ cient
 and output gap feedback coe¢ cient y respectively.
For the former, we set  at the benchmark level of 2 and vary  from 1:1 to 2:8. We
plot the results in Figure 12. By panels (a) and (b), it is obvious that when  < 

, we
have ~E < 0 and ~B > 0, i.e. if the home country puts relatively less weight on ination
stabilization when conducting monetary policy, there tends to be a two-way capital ows
with the home country holding a negative net position in equities and a positive net
position in bonds.
When  < 

, by panel (c), the correlation e¤ect associated with ~1 is above that
associated with ~2, which involves a relatively large negative position in home equity and
thus a negative net equity position. However, there is a minor conicting e¤ect from the
variability e¤ect. By panel (e), the variability e¤ect associated with ~1 is below that
associated with ~2, partially o¤setting the correlation e¤ect.
By panel (d), when  < 

, both the correlation and variability e¤ects associated
with the home bond are lower than those associated with the foreign bond. This means
the position in the home bond should be smaller than that of foreign bond, which explains
a positive net bond position.
For the asymmetry in y, we set 

y at the benchmark level of 0:1 and change the
home value from 0:01 to 0:19. As shown in Figure 13, it turns out that when y > 

y,
~E < 0 and ~B > 0, i.e. if the monetary policy in home country reacts more to the
output gap than in foreign country, there tends to be a two-way capital ow between the
two countries, with the home country holding a net negative position in equities and a
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net positive position in bonds.
When y > 

y, the correlation e¤ect associated with the home equity is well above
that associated with the foreign equity (panel (c)) while the variability e¤ect associated
with the home equity is slightly below that associated with the foreign equity (panel (e)),
so in total, the position of the home equity will exceeds that of the foreign equity which
leads to a negative ~E.
For bond assets however, when y > 

y, both the correlation and variability e¤ects
associated with the home bond are below those associated with the foreign bond (panels
(d) and (f)). The emphasis on output stabilization in the developing country at the same
time (relatively) undermines the relevance of the home bond in risk hedging and the risk
amount to be hedged against by it, which implies a smaller position in the home bond
compared to that of the foreign bond and thus a positive ~B.
5.1.8 Price/Wage indexation
We turn to asymmetries in price and wage indexation across countries in this subsection.
For price indexation, we set ! at the standard value of 0:24 and change the home value
from 0:12 to 0:36 while for wage indexation, we set $ at the standard value of 0:58 and
change the home value from 0:46 to 0:70. As is shown in Figure 14 and 2:15, when ! > !
or/and $ > $, then ~E < 0 and ~B > 0; so there is a two-way capital ow with the
home country holding a negative net position in equities and a positive net position in
bonds. The results tend to suggest that a high degree of price and wage indexation in
developing countries is consistent with the emergence of two-way capital ows between
the two groups of countries. However, as in the case of asymmetries in the degree of price
and wage rigidity ( and &), the asymmetries in ! and $ have a very small e¤ect on net
equity and bond positions.
5.1.9 Habit formation
The degree of habit formation is governed by the parameter h. To assess the e¤ect of
asymmetry in h on two-way capital ows, we set h at the benchmark value of 0:7 and
vary the value of h from 0:58 to 0:82. Figure 16 plots the result. It is clear from panels (a)
and (b) that when h < h, we have ~E < 0 and ~B > 0, i.e. if the home households have a
lower degree of habit formation than foreign households, this will result in two-way capital
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ows with the home country holding a negative net position in equities and a positive net
position in bonds.
When h < h, we have ~E < 0 because both the correlation and variability e¤ect
associated with the home equity are above those associated with the foreign equity (panels
(c) and (e)). For bond positions, when h < h, we have ~B > 0 because on the one hand,
the correlation e¤ect associated with the home bond is relatively lower than that of the
foreign bond, on the other hand, the variability e¤ect associated with it is relatively higher
but the correlation e¤ect dominates.
5.1.10 Market competitiveness
We can use the parameter of ' to represent the degree of competitiveness in an economy.
The lower is ', the lower is the substitutability between varieties and so the more power
rms have when setting prices. Also note that the optimal price of nal good is a mark-
up over associated marginal cost of production, '
' 1 , so the lower is ' the higher is the
mark-up. In other words, the lower is ', the lower is the degree of market competitiveness.
To check the e¤ect of the asymmetry associated with ' on two-way capital ows, we
set the value of ' at 10 as in the benchmark calibration and vary the value of ' from 7
to 13 which corresponds to a price mark-up from about 8:3% to 16:7% in economy. As is
shown in Figure 17, two-way capital ows arise if ' is less than ', i.e. the home market
is less competitive than the foreign market.
When ' < ', the correlation e¤ect associated with the home equity is below that
associated with the foreign equity while the variability e¤ect associated with the home
equity is above that associated with the foreign equity (panels (c) and (e)). The di¤erence
in variability e¤ect is quantitatively more important, so the gross position in the home
equity is relatively large (in absolute value) and ~E < 0. For bond assets, the correlation
e¤ect associated with the home bond is also below that associated with the foreign bond
while the variability e¤ect associated with the home bond is above that associated with
the foreign bond (panels (d) and (f)). However, the di¤erence in correlation e¤ect is
quantitatively more important, so the gross position in the home bond is relatively small
(in absolute value) and ~B > 0.
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Figure 16: Habit formation h
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Figure 17: Market competitiveness '
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5.1.11 Pricing strategy
Di¤erent pricing strategies, PCP or LCP , have di¤erent implications for behaviour of
import prices. So it is worthwhile to check the cases in which the developing and devel-
oped countries price products according to di¤erent strategies. Because, without loss of
generality, the home country is viewed as developing country and the currencies used in
international transactions are usually those of developed country, it is natural to believe
that the rms in the home country use LCP while the rms in the foreign country use
PCP . Based on this belief, in what follows we consider two experiments. First, sup-
pose the rms in the home country all set prices of tradables according to LCP and the
foreign countrys pricing strategy stands at di¤erent position between perfect LCP and
PCP , one can interpret this as such that some foreign rms adopt LCP while others
adopt PCP . Second, suppose conversely that the rms in foreign country all set prices of
tradables according to PCP and the home countrys pricing strategy stands at di¤erent
positions between perfect LCP and PCP , again one can interpret this as such that some
home rms adopt LCP while others adopt PCP .
For the former experiment, we set  = 0 and vary value of  from 0 to 1. The
result is displayed in Figure 18. Note that the symmetric benchmark corresponds to the
allocation at the left-hand side in all panels in the gure. It is obvious from the gure, as
the foreign countrys choice of pricing strategy approaches PCP , the portfolio allocations
exhibit two-way capital ows, i.e. when 0 =  < , we have ~E < 0 while ~B > 0
(panels (a) and (b)), so the home country has a net negative holding of equities and a
net positive holding of bonds. Further investigation shows that when 0 =  < , the
correlation e¤ects associated with home assets are roughly the same as those associated
with foreign assets, however, the variability e¤ect associated with the home equity is above
that associated with the foreign equity (panel (e)) while the variability e¤ect associated
with the home bond is below that associated with the foreign bond (panel (f)), so the
net equity position is negative while the net bond position is positive.
For the second experiment, we set  at 1 and vary the value of  from 0 to 1. The result
is displayed in Figure 19. Note that the allocation at the right-hand side in all panels in
the gure corresponds to a symmetric case. By panels (a) and (b), as the home countrys
choice of pricing strategy approaches LCP , the portfolio allocations always exhibit two-
way capital ows, i.e. when  <  = 1, we have ~E < 0 while ~B > 0; so the home
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Figure 18: Pricing strategy: Foreign country moving to PCP 
53
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-1
-0.5
0
x 10-3 (a) Net f oreign equity
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
(c) Corr(zy,r1x|r-1x ) & Corr(zy,r2x|r-2x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
43.95
44
44.05
(e) StD(zy|r-1x )/StD(r1x|r-1x ) & StD(zy|r-2x )/StD(r2x|r-2x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.053
0.054
0.055
(g) StD(zy|r-1x ) & StD(zy|r-2x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.2
1.22
1.24
x 10-3
(i) StD(r1x|r-1x ) & StD(r2x|r-2x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
x 10-3 (b) Net f oreign bond
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.4
(d) Corr(zy,r3x|r-3x ) & Corr(zy,r4x|r-4x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
6.32
6.34
6.36
6.38
6.4
(f ) StD(zy|r-3x )/StD(r3x|r-3x ) & StD(zy|r-4x )/StD(r4x|r-4x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.056
0.057
0.058
(h) StD(zy|r-3x ) & StD(zy|r-4x )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
8.98
9
9.02
9.04
x 10-3
(j) StD(r3x|r-3x ) & StD(r4x|r-4x )
Figure 19: Price strategy: Home country moving to LCP 
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country has a negative net holding of equities and a positive net holding of bonds. Further
investigation shows that when  <  = 1, as in the previous experiment, the correlation
e¤ects of home and foreign assets are roughly the same, however, the variability e¤ect
associated with the home equity is above that associated with the foreign equity (panel
(e)) while the variability e¤ect associated with the home bond is below that associated
with the foreign bond (panel (f)), so the net equity position is negative while the net
bond position is positive.
So to sum up, if the home country has a lower  compared to the foreign country, i.e.
the developing countrys pricing strategy is relatively close to LCP while the developed
countrys strategy is relatively close to PCP , two-way capital ows arise. However, again
we have to notice that the magnitude of the e¤ect that the asymmetry has on net positions
is very small. It turns out that it is always below 0:001 so we also view the asymmetry
as a minor factor in a¤ecting the pattern of two-way capital ows.
5.1.12 Short summary
In this section, we have examined the various asymmetriesrole in generating two-way
capital ows between the two types of countries. We have obtained at least two sets of
result. The rst set of result concerns the question of which direction the asymmetries
impact the pattern of capital ows. And we have found that the following facts are
candidates in favour of the emergence of two-way capital ows (which are consistent
with observed data for developing countries). Compared to a developed country, in a
developing country, if rms use more labour intensive technology a > a; it is less costly
for them to adjust investment  <  ; when setting prices for products and labour (given
that both countries feature high nominal rigidity) they are confronted with more frictions
 >  and/or & > &; in the traded sector, rms set the prices through LCP more often,
 < ; households consume more traded goods  <  and imports  < ; traded and
non-traded goods are more substitutable  > ; there is less persistent habit formation
h < h; the monetary authority responds more intensely to the output gap while less so
to ination, y > 

y and/or  < 

; the market in developing country is less competitive
' < '; and the degree of price/wage indexation is higher ! > ! and/or $ > $. The
second set of results concerns the magnitude of the e¤ects of asymmetries on two-way
capital ows. While some asymmetries that we mentioned do a¤ect the pattern of capital
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ows, they are not that important because the magnitude of their e¤ects is relatively low.
These include the asymmetries associated with nominal rigidities, the degree of price/wage
indexation and pricing strategy. So we see that the pattern of two-way capital ows is more
likely driven by asymmetries in real factors instead of asymmetries in nominal factors. In
addition, we found that not all asymmetries in the model are relevant for the question
of two-way capital ows. For instance, asymmetry in the substitutability between home
and foreign traded goods has no e¤ect on the pattern of two-way capital ows.
5.2 A fully asymmetric simulation
After investigating the e¤ect of each asymmetry on the pattern of country portfolios, we
will now undertake another exercise, i.e. taking into account all asymmetries at the same
time. In this section, we simulate the model in a fully asymmetric way. This will yield
steady-state portfolios allowing us to assess the composite e¤ect of coexistence of multiple
asymmetries.
Following our convention, the home and foreign countries are labelled as developing
and developed country respectively. Our strategy is to choose parameter values for the
home country from the estimates based on the data of developing countries, especially
China, (if they are available) while choosing parameter values for the foreign country
from the estimates based on the data of developed countries, especially U:S:. The task
of choosing parameter values for the foreign country is already done in the symmetric
simulation. Now we describe how we choose parameter values for the home country.
In the model, the value of many parameters in the foreign country is obtained from
Smets and Wouters (2007). That paper estimates a New Keynesian model of the U:S:
economy. Recently, there are many studies applying the framework to emerging markets,
in particular China, and these provide us with estimates of parameters in the context of
developing countries. The main contributions to this empirical literature include Mehro-
tra et al. (2011), Sun and Sen (2012), Dai (2012) and Miao and Peng (2012) among
others. In the following exercise, we mainly rely on Sun and Sens (2012) estimation in
choosing parameter values. These parameters include the degrees of price/wage stickiness
 and &, the degrees of price/wage indexation ! and $, habit persistence h, the feedback
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Description Variable values
Calvo price rigidity parameter  = 0:95,  = 0:66
Calvo wage rigidity parameter & = 0:79, & = 0:70
Price indexation ! = 0:97, ! = 0:24
Wage indexation $ = 0:61, $ = 0:58
Discount factor  =  = 0:99
Habit persistence h = 0:81, h = 0:70
Risk aversion coe¢ cient  =  = 1:38
Labour supply elasticity  =  = 2:83
Share of home traded goods in traded basket  =  = 0:58
Share of nontraded goods in consumption  =  = 0:40
Substitutability between Home and Foreign tradables  =  = 1:50
Substitutability between nontraded and traded goods  =  = 0:45
Substitutability between individual goods ' = ' = 10
Labour share of income in traded goods sector aT = 0:5, aT = 0:67
Labour share of income in nontraded goods sector aN = 0:5, aN = 0:67
Capital depreciation rate  =  = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost  =   = 0:25
Share of government spending g = g = 0:18
Interest rate smoothing factor in Taylor rule R = 0:98, 

R = 0:81
Ination feedback in Taylor rule  = 1:67, 

 = 2
Output feedback in Taylor rule Y = 0:15, 

Y = 0:1
Pricing strategies  = 0,  = 1
Persistence of technology shock in traded sector TT1 = 0:93, TT2 = 0
TT1 = 0; 

TT2 = 0:95
Variance of technology shock in traded sector T = 0:0277; T = 0:0045
Technology shock in non-traded sector NN1 = 0:93, NN2 = 0
NN1 = 0; 

NN2 = 0:95
Variance of technology shock in non-traded sector N = 0:0277; N = 0:0045
Cross terms of technology shocks TN1 = TN2 = 0:60;
NT1 = NT2 = 0
TN1 = 

TN2 = 0:60;
NT1 = 

NT2 = 0
Monetary policy shock rr = 0:15, rr = 0:0015
rr = 0:15, 

rr = 0:0024
Government spending shock G = 0:90, G = 0:0877
G = 0:97, 

G = 0:0053
Mark-up shock V = 0:89, V = 0:05
V = 0:89, 

V = 0:002
Labour supply shock  = 0:90,  = 0:025
 = 0:90, 

 = 0:025
Investment adjustment cost shock  = 0:78,  = 0:0128
 = 0:71, 

 = 0:0045
Table 3: Parameter values: Asymmetric case
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coe¢ cients in monetary policy R,  and y and the persistence and volatility of various
shocks.
The discount factors are assumed to be equalized to be consistent with our assumptions
of equalized autarky interest rates across countries and F = 0 in steady state. For the
same reason, the values of the parameters appearing in householdspreference are assumed
to be in line with the benchmark. These include  and . Mehrotra et al (2011) estimates
the elasticity of investment with respect to the current price of installed capital in China,
1= , and nds it is very close to that found in the U:S: by Christiano et al. (2005), which
make us to choose  =  . Based on Miao and Pengs (2012) estimation, the values of
g and  are also the same as their foreign counterparts. For the choice of labour share
of production a, there is a wide spectrum. According to Chinese data (that reported
in china statistical yearbook), the labour income share is at around 0:5 which is much
lower than that in the U:S:. However, the current literature suggests that the real share
in China should be higher than this and view the reported level as puzzling. Based on
the literature, the reason for a reported low a are possibly due to measurement problems
(Golin 2002) or/and misallocation frictions (Hsieh and Klelow 2009). Na (2015) estimates
an average labour share for emerging countries of 0:7. For our simulation, because a is
chosen based on reported share we also use the reported level of a = 0:5. Note that
according to our analysis in the last section, a higher a tends to strengthen the pattern
of two-way capital ows.
It is another challenge to obtain the estimates of the parameters that associated with
open economy for the developing country. These include the share of traded goods in all
tradables, , the share of non-traded goods in the consumption basket, ; and the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign traded goods, ; and that between traded and
non-traded goods, . Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2015) ; using data from 38 poor and
emerging countries, calibrate  and  at 0:44 and 0:5 which are still within the range
of the parameter estimation for developed countries. Some literature, such as Laxton et
al. (2010) and Prasad and Zhang (2015) ; use the same value of these parameters for the
di¤erent types of country. Due to the lack of accurate estimate for these parameters for
developing countries and the fact that (to our knowledge) no evidence shows a signicant
di¤erence between these estimates in developing and developed countries, we follow the
approach of Laxton et al. (2010) and Prasad and Zhang (2015) to be on the safe side
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  0:4177
Foreign equity ~2 = 0:1341
Net equity asset ~E =  0:2836
Home bond ~3 =  0:0739
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:3575
Net bond asset ~B = 0:2836
Table 4: Optimal portfolio choices: Fully asymmetric case
in our simulation. (We also assume that the elasticity of substitution among individual
goods ' are the same across countries.) For simplicity, we assume that the rms in the
home country use LCP to price their exports while those in the foreign country use PCP ,
so  = 0 and  = 1.
Given that the di¤erences between the two countries are specied by the parameter
values as in Table 2:3, the result of fully asymmetric simulation of the model is documented
in Table 2:4. According to the results, the home country sells the home equity to the
amount of 0:42 (multiplied by Y ) while it buys the foreign equity to the amount of
0:13, which results in a negative net position of equity, ~E =  0:28 < 0. On the other
hand, the home country also sells the home bond to the amount of 0:07 while it buys
the foreign bond to the amount of 0:36, which results in a positive net position in bonds,
~B = 0:28 > 0. By the condition of asset market clearing, the short position of an asset
at home is a long position of the asset in the foreign country, ~i =  ~i . This leads to
the fact that in foreign country we must have ~E > 0 and ~

B < 0. Putting these facts
together, we observe that the optimal portfolio allocations between the two asymmetric
countries can be just described by the pattern of two-way capital ows, i.e. the home
(developing) country ends up with a negative net position in equities and a positive
net position in bonds while the foreign (developed) country ends up with a positive net
position in equities and a negative net position in bonds.
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Assets menu Optimal portfolio choices
Home equity ~1 =  0:4442
Foreign equity ~2 = 0:1081
Net equity asset ~E =  0:3361
Foreign bond ~4 = 0:3361
Net bond asset ~B = 0:3361
Table 5: Optimal portfolio choices: Asymmetry in asset menu
5.3 Asymmetry in asset menu
In our model, we assume that both countries can issue equities and bonds. However, due
to nancial underdevelopment and high risk of default in emerging markets, international
bonds that are frequently transacted are those issued by advanced economies. In this sub-
section, let us consider the situation where the asset menu o¤ered by the two countries
in international nancial market is asymmetric. Specically, suppose that the home (de-
veloping) country can only issue home equity while the developed country can issue both
foreign equity and a bond. The specication of other aspects of the model is the same as
before. Under the current fully asymmetric parameterization, the optimal country port-
folios is computed and displayed in Table 2:5. By this result, the home country sells the
home equity to the amount of 0:44 (multiplied by Y ) and buys the foreign equity to the
amount of 0:11, which, again, implies a negative net position of equity ~E =  0:34 < 0.
At the same time, the home country buys the foreign bond to the amount of 0:34. The
home bond being absent, this also implies the net position in bonds of the same volume
~B = 0:34 > 0. By the same argument, the reverse pattern of net asset positions will be
seen in the foreign country. As in the last subsection, with the asymmetric asset menu, a
two-way capital ow between the two countries persists. Moreover, because net positions
of equities and bonds are both higher (in absolute value) than before, the asymmetry in
fact strengthens the pattern of capital ows.
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6 Conclusion
There is a noticeable heterogeneity in countrys asset composition of the gross ows and
positions. In the literature, this is documented as the pattern of short equity, long bond
in (many) developing countries and long equity, short bondin developed countries. We
present an international macroeconomic model of both equity and bond portfolios in
this paper. It shows that the presence of a selection of empirically relevant asymmetries
between two countries can generate such a pattern of capital ows.
We nd that these asymmetries include those related to industrial structure, sever-
ity of nominal rigidities, trade openness, consumption home bias, investment adjustment
frictions, monetary policy stance, market competitiveness and pricing strategy of interna-
tional trade, etc. In particular, for the two-way capital ows to happen, it is found that
this can be the case if the developing country relies on more labour intensive technology
to produce, or/and is more dependent on international trade, or/and features less local
goods preference, or/and faces a relative low cost of investment adjustment, or/and is less
focused on ination stabilization while more focused on stabilization of the output gap
when conduct monetary policy, or/and has a less competitive goods market. We also nd
that the factors from the real side of economy are more important than those from the
nominal side. With the help of other empirical studiesresults of parameter estimation,
the fully simulated model yields optimal portfolio holdings that are broadly consistent
with the pattern of two-way capital ows. Moreover, if we assume that international
bonds can only be issued by the developed country (as it is often the case in reality) the
result is strengthened.
The paper highlights the role of correlation and variability e¤ects in understanding the
size of gross positions of certain types of asset which have particular importance in driving
two-way capital ows. The correlation e¤ect reects how relevant the asset is in hedging
risks while the variability e¤ect reects how much the amount of risk exposure is for the
asset to hedge against. It turns out that the size of portfolio holdings are increasing in
both of the e¤ects.
The contribution of this work is at least threefold. Firstly, we use an open economy
model with full-edged New Keynesian features and endogenous portfolio choices. This
framework is very general and obviously convenient to be modied for the purposes of
understanding many other international macroeconomic issues where the presence of dis-
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tinct country portfolios is required. Secondly, we identify a selection of factors that matter
in accounting for heterogeneous asset composition. This is not only useful for explaining
the two-way capital ows between developing and developed countries. As an example,
the patterns of international capital ows within the group of developed countries or that
of developing countries can be explored. Lastly, we make use of the recent estimation of
structural parameter values that are based on the data of the U:S: and China when sim-
ulating our model. The results contribute to the related literature on emerging markets,
especially China.
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Appendix
A Price setting in the nal goods sector (LCP)
In this section, we show how optimal prices are chosen in the nal goods sector. The
case of the traded sector is considered while the case of non-traded sector can be obtained
similarly. Besides, the case of LCP is considered while the case of PCP can be obtained
by removing S from the prot function and then following similar derivations.
The rms problem has been described by Eqs.(2:35  38) in the main text. The
related Lagrangian function for the problem is
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First-order condition with respect to pDt (z) is
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Rearranging the equation, one obtains Eq.(2:39).
Similarly, rst-order condition with respect to pXt (z), @t@pDt(z) = 0, leads to Eq.(2:40).
We omit the derivations here.
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